Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications
On Efficiancy in Optimal Mechanisms
Dynamic Incentives for Buy-Side Analysts
How to sell hard information
Can Society Function without Ethical Agents? An Informational Perspective
Bargaining with Evolving Private Information
Monotone Additive Statistics
Optimal Group Testing with Heterogeneous Risks
An Axiomatic Model of Persuasion
Asymmetric Information and Security Design under Knightian Uncertainty
Information Design by an Informed Designer
Bayesian Incentive Compatibility with and without Free Beliefs
The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with One-Sided Offers
Project Choice from a Verifiable Proposal
Learning from Manipulable Signals
Misspecified Higher-Order Beliefs and Failures of Social Learning
Learning Dynamics in Social Networks
Platform Competition for Exclusivity with a Marquee Seller
Multi-Dimensional Screening with Buyer-Optimal Learning
Lindahl Equilibrium as a Collective Choice Rule
Reciprocity in Dynamic Employment Relationships
Retailer-led Marketplaces
Information Processing: Contracts versus Communication
Detecting collusion using bid rotation
Collective Brand Reputation
Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets with Adverse Selection
Optimal Sequential Contests
Digital Monopolies: Privacy Protection or Price Regulation
The multiple-volunteer principle
Partially Directed Search for Wages
Equilibrium Contracts and Boundedly Rational Expectations
Transparence in Hierachies
Data and competition: a general framework
The Optimal Certifier when Firms Enter and Invest
Demand for safety, risky loans: A model of securitization.
A Theory of Socially Responsible Investment
Merger Remedies in Multimarket Oligopoly
Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition
Economics and Human Motivation: Charles Darwin meets Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant
Projection of Private Values in Auctions
Normative Equilibrium:The permissible and the forbidden as devices for bringing order to economic environments
Bilateral Trade with Justification
Tampering with Information
Acquisition of Stochastic Evidence
Strategic Sample Selection
Regret Theory and Salience Theory: Total Strangers, Distant Relatives or Close Cousins?
Vertical contracting and buyer power in procurement
Dynamic Coordination with Flexible Security Design
Correlated Large Contests
Strategy-proofness and perfect mechanisms
Is Bounded Rationality Driven by Limited Ability?
Knowing What Matters to Others: Information Selection in Auctions
Concerned with careers? Career development, task assignment, and labour market competition
Reconciliating Relational Contracting and Hold-up: A Model of Repeated Negotiations
Competition for Context-Sensitive Consumers
Organizing Competition for the Market
Mechanism Design without Euclid's Fourth Postulate
Rational Expectations, Stable Beliefs, and Stable Matching
Aiming for the goal: Contribution dynamics of crowdfunding
Online Social Networks: Approval by Design
Strategy-Proof Exchange under Trichotomous Preferences
Revenue Gaps for Discriminatory and Anonymous pricing
Testable Implications of Models of Intertemporal Choice
Optimal Information Disclosure by Crowd Funding Platforms
Invariance and Matching Market Outcomes
Sequential Procurement without Commitment
The splitting problem applied to Bayesian persuasion and mechanism design with externalities
Information design in multi-stage games
Social Media and the news industry
Inconsistency, choice and internal conflict
Deceptive Products and Competition in Search Markets
Experiments as convex functions: three applications
The Impact of Price Discrimination in Markets with Adverse Selection
Assigning an unpleasant job without payment
Information Design: Insights from Orderings of Dependence and Heterogeneity
Patent Pools in Input Markets
Differentiated Durable Goods
Liquidity benefits and bank capital requirements
Collusion in Auctions: An informed principal perspective
Evaluation Theory of Wage Growth
Competing Mechanisms in Markets for Lemons (joint wit S. Auster)
Optimal Sequential Decision with Limited Attention
Measuring the Effectiveness of Anti-Cartel Interventions: A Conceptual Framework
Cheap talk and commitment in Bayesian games
