Renegotiation-Proof Cheap Talk
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Pairwise efficiency and monotonicity imply Pareto efficiency in (probabilistic) object allocation
Daniil Larionov (University of Münster)
tba.
The 1st Berlin Micro Theory and Behavioral Economics PhD Conference will take place from July 7 to 9, 2025, at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
Surplus Division and the Burden of Proof
News Media as Suppliers of Narratives (and Information)
Information Aggregation in Large Protests
Time is Knowledge: What Response Times Reveal
A mechanism-design approach to property rights
Information Design with Costly State Verification
Hidden overtime: Contracting with an image-concerned agent
Privacy Preserving Signals
Sequential Mechanisms for Evidence Acquisition
Dynamic Screening: Why Weight isn't Volume
A Theory of Self-Prospection
A Theory of Auditability for Allocation and Social Choice Mechanisms
Contracts that Reward Innovation: Delegated Experimentation with an Informed Principal
Robust product design and pricing
Disclosure and Incentives in Teams
Crowding, Funding, and Capital in School Choice Matching
Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice:When is there a trade-off?
Evidence Disclosure in Competitive Markets
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms
Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional World
Bargaining under incomplete information with the help of delay
The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction
An organizational theory of unionization
Competition and Herding in Breaking News
Mediated (Anti)Persuasive Communication
The Value of Privacy in Cartels: An Analysis of the Inner Workings of a Bidding Ring
Endogenous Information Acquisition in Cheap-Talk Games
The College Portfolio Problem
Strategic Concealment in Innovation Races
Connecting the Dots: Markets for Data
Open-ended matching with and without markets
How to study symmetric equilibria in binary action games
Price Competition, Information Acquisition, and Product Differentiation Perception
Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms
Old models: delist or discount?
The comparative statics of persuasion
Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Recommendations and Competition
Calibrated Clustering and Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium
Comparative statics with adjustment costs and the le Chatelier principle
Lexicographic Numbers in Extensive Form Games
Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses and Adverse Selection
Dual Pricing in a Model of Sales
Acquisition, (Mis)use and Dissemination of Information
Resolving Child Custody Disputes Efficiently
Spontaneous discrimination with endogenous information disclosure
Comparison of Experiments in Monotone Problems
Consumer Search and Choice Overload
Superiority Seeking and the Preference for Exclusion
Smart Contracts and the Coase Conjecture
Multi-Dimensional Screening: Buyer-Optimal Learning and Informational Robustness
Dutch versus First-Price Auction with Dynamic Reference-Dependent Preferences
Distracted from Comparison: Product Design and Advertisement with limited Attention
Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents
Consumer Surplus in the Dark
Supply Network Formation and Fragility
Organized Information Transmission
Keeping the agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms
Allocation Mechanisms without Reduction
Stochastic Impatience and the Separation of Time and Risk Preferences
Partnership with Persistence
Games Played by Teams of Players
Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications
On Efficiancy in Optimal Mechanisms
Dynamic Incentives for Buy-Side Analysts
How to sell hard information
Can Society Function without Ethical Agents? An Informational Perspective
Bargaining with Evolving Private Information
Monotone Additive Statistics
Optimal Group Testing with Heterogeneous Risks
An Axiomatic Model of Persuasion
Asymmetric Information and Security Design under Knightian Uncertainty
Information Design by an Informed Designer
Bayesian Incentive Compatibility with and without Free Beliefs
The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with One-Sided Offers
Project Choice from a Verifiable Proposal
Learning from Manipulable Signals
Misspecified Higher-Order Beliefs and Failures of Social Learning
Learning Dynamics in Social Networks
Platform Competition for Exclusivity with a Marquee Seller
Multi-Dimensional Screening with Buyer-Optimal Learning
Lindahl Equilibrium as a Collective Choice Rule
Reciprocity in Dynamic Employment Relationships
Retailer-led Marketplaces
Information Processing: Contracts versus Communication
Detecting collusion using bid rotation
Collective Brand Reputation
Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets with Adverse Selection
Optimal Sequential Contests
Digital Monopolies: Privacy Protection or Price Regulation
The multiple-volunteer principle
Partially Directed Search for Wages
Equilibrium Contracts and Boundedly Rational Expectations
Transparence in Hierachies
Data and competition: a general framework
The Optimal Certifier when Firms Enter and Invest
Demand for safety, risky loans: A model of securitization.
A Theory of Socially Responsible Investment
Merger Remedies in Multimarket Oligopoly
Overconfidence and Prejudice
Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition
Economics and Human Motivation: Charles Darwin meets Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant
Projection of Private Values in Auctions
Normative Equilibrium:The permissible and the forbidden as devices for bringing order to economic environments
Bilateral Trade with Justification
Tampering with Information
Acquisition of Stochastic Evidence
Strategic Sample Selection
Regret Theory and Salience Theory: Total Strangers, Distant Relatives or Close Cousins?
Vertical contracting and buyer power in procurement
Dynamic Coordination with Flexible Security Design
Correlated Large Contests
Strategy-proofness and perfect mechanisms
Is Bounded Rationality Driven by Limited Ability?
Knowing What Matters to Others: Information Selection in Auctions
Persuasion Meets Delegation
Procurement of Complex Innovation
Concerned with careers? Career development, task assignment, and labour market competition
Reconciliating Relational Contracting and Hold-up: A Model of Repeated Negotiations
A model of focusing in political choice
Competition for Context-Sensitive Consumers
Organizing Competition for the Market
Sequential Collective Search in Networks
Mechanism Design without Euclid's Fourth Postulate
Rational Expectations, Stable Beliefs, and Stable Matching
Aiming for the goal: Contribution dynamics of crowdfunding
Online Social Networks: Approval by Design
Strategy-Proof Exchange under Trichotomous Preferences
Information Design and Career Concerns
Revenue Gaps for Discriminatory and Anonymous pricing
Information design in the hold-up problem
Testable Implications of Models of Intertemporal Choice
Optimal Information Disclosure by Crowd Funding Platforms
Strategic Shirking in Competitive Labor Markets: A General Model of Multi-Task Promotion Tournaments with Employer Learning
Identifying the Best Agent in a Network
Dynamic Persuasion with Outside Information
Invariance and Matching Market Outcomes
Sequential Procurement without Commitment
The splitting problem applied to Bayesian persuasion and mechanism design with externalities
The Swing Voter’s Curse in Social Networks
On Information Design in Games
Information design in multi-stage games
Information disclosure and monopolistic screening
Social Media and the news industry
Dynamic procurement under uncertainty: competition and auctions
Inconsistency, choice and internal conflict
Deceptive Products and Competition in Search Markets
Dynamic nonmonetary incentives
Dynamic Pricing with Search Frictions
Experiments as convex functions: three applications
Competitive Compensation Contracts
The Impact of Price Discrimination in Markets with Adverse Selection
Prizes versus contracts as incentives for innovation
Optimal Delegation, Unawareness, and Financial Intermediation
Assigning an unpleasant job without payment
Information Design: Insights from Orderings of Dependence and Heterogeneity
Keeping Your Story Straight: Truthtelling and Liespotting (with Xiaosheng Mu and Nicolas Vieille)
Evaluating Strategic Forecasters
Costly Verification in Collective Decisions
Observations on cooperation
Patent Pools in Input Markets
Only time will tell: A theory of deferred compensation and its regulation
Differentiated Durable Goods
Liquidity benefits and bank capital requirements
Advance-Purchase Financing of Projects with Few Buyers
Collusion in Auctions: An informed principal perspective
Challenging conformity: A case for diversity
Evaluation Theory of Wage Growth
Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities (joint with I. Segal)
The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence (joint with J. Combe and C. Terrier)
Optimal Structure and Dissolution of Partnerships
(joint with Simon Loertscher)
Competing Mechanisms in Markets for Lemons (joint wit S. Auster)
Time Preferences and Bargaining
Dynamic moral hazard with learning or temporal dependence
Strategic outsourcing and optimal procurement
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games
A New Look at Oligopoly: Implicit Collusion Through Portfolio Diversification
Optimal Sequential Decision with Limited Attention
A game-theoretic model of LIBOR manipulation
Measuring the Effectiveness of Anti-Cartel Interventions: A Conceptual Framework
Rational Inattention Dynamics: Inertia and Delay in Decision-Making
Optimal stopping in a principal agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers
Consumer Search Costs and Preferences on the Internet
Cheap talk and commitment in Bayesian games
On Breakthroughs, Deadlines, and the Nature of Progress: Contracting for Multistage Projects
Do you mind me paying less? Measuring Other-Regarding Preferences in the Market for Taxis
The Curse of Poverty and the Blessings of Wealth
Common values and the Coase conjecture: Inefficiencies in frictionless contract renegotiation
Common values and the Coase conjecture: Inefficiencies in frictionless contract renegotiation
Broadcasters Competition on Quality: a Welfare Perspective
Coordination and the fight against tax havens
Spence meets Holmstrom: Luck and repetition in signalling
Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Trade
Cereals, Appropriability and Hierarchy
