Berlin Micro Theory Seminar

This term the Berlin micro theory group organizes a joint online seminar series with the University of Bonn. The seminar takes place on Wednesdays during the semester from 16:30-17:45. The seminar series is also sponsored by the CRC TRR 190 on Rationality and Competition.

Please send an email to microtheory.wiwi(at) to sign up for the seminars.

Previous Events


Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications

On Efficiancy in Optimal Mechanisms

Dynamic Incentives for Buy-Side Analysts

How to sell hard information

Can Society Function without Ethical Agents? An Informational Perspective

Bargaining with Evolving Private Information

Optimal Group Testing with Heterogeneous Risks

Asymmetric Information and Security Design under Knightian Uncertainty

Information Design by an Informed Designer

Bayesian Incentive Compatibility with and without Free Beliefs

The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with One-Sided Offers

Project Choice from a Verifiable Proposal

Learning from Manipulable Signals

Misspecified Higher-Order Beliefs and Failures of Social Learning

Learning Dynamics in Social Networks

Platform Competition for Exclusivity with a Marquee Seller

Multi-Dimensional Screening with Buyer-Optimal Learning

Lindahl Equilibrium as a Collective Choice Rule

Reciprocity in Dynamic Employment Relationships

Information Processing: Contracts versus Communication

Detecting collusion using bid rotation

Collective Brand Reputation

Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets with Adverse Selection

Digital Monopolies: Privacy Protection or Price Regulation

Partially Directed Search for Wages

Equilibrium Contracts and Boundedly Rational Expectations

Transparence in Hierachies

Data and competition: a general framework

The Optimal Certifier when Firms Enter and Invest

Demand for safety, risky loans: A model of securitization.

A Theory of Socially Responsible Investment

Merger Remedies in Multimarket Oligopoly

Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition

Economics and Human Motivation: Charles Darwin meets Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant

Projection of Private Values in Auctions

Normative Equilibrium:The permissible and the forbidden as devices for bringing order to economic environments

Bilateral Trade with Justification

Acquisition of Stochastic Evidence

Regret Theory and Salience Theory: Total Strangers, Distant Relatives or Close Cousins?

Vertical contracting and buyer power in procurement

Dynamic Coordination with Flexible Security Design

Strategy-proofness and perfect mechanisms

Is Bounded Rationality Driven by Limited Ability?

Knowing What Matters to Others: Information Selection in Auctions

Concerned with careers? Career development, task assignment, and labour market competition

Reconciliating Relational Contracting and Hold-up: A Model of Repeated Negotiations

Competition for Context-Sensitive Consumers

Mechanism Design without Euclid's Fourth Postulate

Rational Expectations, Stable Beliefs, and Stable Matching

Aiming for the goal: Contribution dynamics of crowdfunding

Online Social Networks: Approval by Design

Strategy-Proof Exchange under Trichotomous Preferences

Revenue Gaps for Discriminatory and Anonymous pricing

Testable Implications of Models of Intertemporal Choice

Optimal Information Disclosure by Crowd Funding Platforms

Invariance and Matching Market Outcomes

Sequential Procurement without Commitment

The splitting problem applied to Bayesian persuasion and mechanism design with externalities

Inconsistency, choice and internal conflict

Deceptive Products and Competition in Search Markets

Experiments as convex functions: three applications

The Impact of Price Discrimination in Markets with Adverse Selection

Assigning an unpleasant job without payment

Information Design: Insights from Orderings of Dependence and Heterogeneity

Liquidity benefits and bank capital requirements

Collusion in Auctions: An informed principal perspective

Evaluation Theory of Wage Growth

Competing Mechanisms in Markets for Lemons (joint wit S. Auster)

Optimal Sequential Decision with Limited Attention

Measuring the Effectiveness of Anti-Cartel Interventions: A Conceptual Framework

Cheap talk and commitment in Bayesian games