Berlin Micro Theory Seminar

The Berlin Micro Theory Seminar takes place at the WZB Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (Room B001) on Mondays during the semester from 17:15-18:30. The seminar series is also sponsored by the CRC TRR 190 on Rationality and Competition. Subscribe to the Google Calendar feed or download the ics-file for this seminar series.

Previous Events


The Optimal Certifier when Firms Enter and Invest

Demand for safety, risky loans: A model of securitization.

A Theory of Socially Responsible Investment

Merger Remedies in Multimarket Oligopoly

Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition

Economics and Human Motivation: Charles Darwin meets Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant

Projection of Private Values in Auctions

Normative Equilibrium:The permissible and the forbidden as devices for bringing order to economic environments

Bilateral Trade with Justification

Acquisition of Stochastic Evidence

Regret Theory and Salience Theory: Total Strangers, Distant Relatives or Close Cousins?

Vertical contracting and buyer power in procurement

Dynamic Coordination with Flexible Security Design

Strategy-proofness and perfect mechanisms

Is Bounded Rationality Driven by Limited Ability?

Knowing What Matters to Others: Information Selection in Auctions

Concerned with careers? Career development, task assignment, and labour market competition

Reconciliating Relational Contracting and Hold-up: A Model of Repeated Negotiations

Competition for Context-Sensitive Consumers

Mechanism Design without Euclid's Fourth Postulate

Rational Expectations, Stable Beliefs, and Stable Matching

Aiming for the goal: Contribution dynamics of crowdfunding

Online Social Networks: Approval by Design

Strategy-Proof Exchange under Trichotomous Preferences

Revenue Gaps for Discriminatory and Anonymous pricing

Testable Implications of Models of Intertemporal Choice

Optimal Information Disclosure by Crowd Funding Platforms

Invariance and Matching Market Outcomes

Sequential Procurement without Commitment

The splitting problem applied to Bayesian persuasion and mechanism design with externalities

Inconsistency, choice and internal conflict

Deceptive Products and Competition in Search Markets

Experiments as convex functions: three applications

The Impact of Price Discrimination in Markets with Adverse Selection

Assigning an unpleasant job without payment

Information Design: Insights from Orderings of Dependence and Heterogeneity

Liquidity benefits and bank capital requirements

Collusion in Auctions: An informed principal perspective

Evaluation Theory of Wage Growth

Competing Mechanisms in Markets for Lemons (joint wit S. Auster)

Optimal Sequential Decision with Limited Attention

Measuring the Effectiveness of Anti-Cartel Interventions: A Conceptual Framework

Cheap talk and commitment in Bayesian games